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conveying information about legal services
that is more conducive to reflection and
the exercise of choice on the part of the
consumer." Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2277.
Ohio argued that a prophylactic rule
was needed to prohibit attorneys from
using legal advice in false or misleading
advertisements. However, the Supreme
Court found that the prophylactic ban
was not the least restrictive way to secure
the state's interests in preventing public
deception. The Supreme Court noted that
the Federal Trade Commission carries out
a similar mission in eliminating unfair or
deceptive advertisements in commerce, and
found that distinguishing deceptive from
nondeceptive -legal-advertisements would
be no more difficult. Id. at 2278-80. The
Court concluded that an attorney--lPay not
be disciplined for soliciting legal business
through printed advertising containing
truthful and nondeceptive information
and advice regarding the legal rights of
others.
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck
down Ohio's restrictions on the use of illustrations in attorney advertisements.
The Court noted that "the use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves
important communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to
the advertiser's message, and it may also
serve to impart information directly." Id.
at 2280. Since commercial illustrations
are entitled to the first amendment protection of verbal commercial speech, the
state had the burden of showing a substantial government interest justifying the
restriction. The Court found that the
state's interest that attorneys maintain
dignity did not justify the abridgement of
their first amendment rights. Furthermore, since advertising could be policed
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on a case-by-case basis, the prophylactic
ban on all illustrations in printed attorney
advertisements was unconstitutional.
Zauderer finally challenged the state's
disclosure requirements in contingent fee
advertisements. Under the Ohio disciplinary rules, an attorney must state that
the client may have to bear certain expenses even if he loses. Zauderer felt this
compulsion violated his first amendment
rights. The Supreme Court found that
since commercial speech was principally
justified by its value to consumers, Zauderer's protected interest in not providing
factual information in his advertising was
minimal, and his interest was adequately
protected by the requirement that the disclosures be reasonably related to the
state's interest in preventing deception of
consumers. The Court then found that
the Ohio requirement of disclosure in
contingent fee ads was rationally related
to the state's goals. The Court noted that
a layman may not be aware of the distinction between "legal fees" and "costs," and
may wrongfully feel that he will entail
no expenses. The Court concluded that
Ohio's ruling was reasonable enough to
support a requirement of disclosure, and
did not violate the first amendment.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zauderer protects an attorney's first amendment right to advertise, yet recognizes the
state's interest in protecting the public
from deception. While the state may no
longer issue blanket bans to prevent an attorney from offering legal advice or using
illustrations in printed advertisements,
the state may evaluate these ads on a caseby-case basis in order to ensure that the
ads are not deceptive. The state may also
compel the disclosure of specific information to prevent an ad from being decep-

tive. As attorneys begin to exercise their
constitutional rights, they should be aware
of the potential of the state to create an
advertising review board, and should endeavor to prevent deceptive printed advertisements from entering into the marketplace of ideas.
- Lawrence M. Meister

Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry":
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
In a case of first impression, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled
that circumstantial evidence, in a products liability action, is sufficient to establish the existence of a defect, thereby enabling the case to survive motions for a
directed verdict and reach the jury. In
Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry" Service Corporation, 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984),

the court reversed in part a directed verdict, at the close of the claimant's case, entered by the Circuit Court for Howard
County Guy J. Cicone, J. in favor of the
defendant manufacturer, Aladdin Industries, Incorporated and seller, "Kash
N'Karry" Service Corporation. The court
reversed the trial court with respect to the
implied warranty of merchantability and
strict liability in tort counts. The counts
sounding in negligence, including failure
to warn, were affirmed by the court.
The factual circumstances of the case
involved the implosion of a pint-size
thermos purchased at "Kash N'Karry"
two or three months prior to the accident.
Testimony by the plaintiff, Irma Virgil,
revealed that the thermos was filled with
coffee and a small amount of milk every
weekday morning. The thermos was then
carried to work, either by its handle or in
a bag containing her shoes. On Saturdays,
the thermos was carried downstairs to her
den, where the plaintiff spent the day
studying.
Mrs. Virgil cleaned the thermos by filling it at night with a solution of baking
soda and warm water. In the morning,
she would wash the thermos with a bottle
brush. The label bore the words, "Easy to
Keep Clean," but there were no instructions on how to clean the thermos or what
constituted a normal manner of cleansing
the thermos. One Saturday morning the
thermos imploded, causing the hot coffee
and glass to be spewn into the face and
eye of Mrs. Virgil. Mrs. Virgil testified
that she did not drop, misuse, abuse, or
damage the thermos in any way, but the
plaintiff failed to present any expert "to
give any scientific explanation for the implosion." !d. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654.

The defendants, during the motion for
a directed verdict and the appeal, maintained that the plaintiff had failed to
present any evidence that the thermos was
defective at the time it was purchased. As
the court explained,
[t]o recover on either theory-implied
warranty or strict liability-the plaintiff in a products liability case must
satisfy three basics from an evidentiary
standpoint: (1) the existence of a defect, (2) the attribution of the defect
to the seller, and (3) a causal relation
between the defect and the injury.
!d. at 30, 484 A.2d at 656.
Thus, the crux of the case became
whether the plaintiff's testimony, with regard to her proper handling of the thermos during the two-to-three month period
between purchase and implosion, satisfied
the "plaintiff's burden to establish that it
is more probable than not that the defect
existed at the time of sale." !d. at 32, 484
A.2d at 657.
The court held that the plaintiffs met
their burden in this case. Initially, the
court rejected the defendant's contention
that expert testimony was needed to establish a defect stating,
[e]xpert testimony is hardly necessary
to establish that a thermos bottle that
explodes or implodes when coffee or
milk are poured into it is defective.
When a product fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the user, "The
inference is that there was some sort
of a defect, a precise definition of
which is unnecessary."
[d. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656 (citing Heaton v.
Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d
806 (1967».
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The court then discussed the sufficiency
of the evidence presented. As stated in
Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md.
App. 226, 437 A.2d 242 (1981), proofofa
defect must rise above surmise, conjecture or speculation, emphasizing that recovery can not be based on the presumption of the accident happening. Dean
Prosser, though, in The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791,843-844 (1966),
declared that the addition of (Ivery little
more in the way of other facts . . . may be
enough" to give rise to an inference that
product is defective from the mere occurrence of an accident.
With the above analysis in mind, the
court held that, "[a]n inference of a defect
may be drawn from the happening of an
accident, where circumstantial evidence
tends to eliminate other causes, such as
product misuse or alteration." Virgil, 61
Md. App. at 32, 484 A.2d at 657.
Fal~

19851The Law Forum-25

The court distinguished the case sub
judice from Jensen, supra. Jensen involved
the loss of control of an automobile allegedly due to a defect in the steering
mechanism where the only evidence produced was the plaintiffs' testimony that
he heard the tires squeal. The court stated
that the plaintiffs in Jensen failed to negate other causes of the accident.
In the area of products liability, involving the theories of strict liability and implied warranty of merchantibility, the
holding in this case has the potential to
provide a "windfall" to plaintiffs. The
practical effect of the decision will be to
shift the essential burden of proof to the
defendant. As it stands now, the plaintiff
is required to testify that he bought the
product and that he did not misuse or
alter the product, thus, effectively shifting to the defendant the burden of proving that the causal effect of the accident
was not produced by the defendant.
The decision has further eroded the rule
of caveat emptor. With regard to strict
liability, it now appears that in order to
reach the jury, who most often will side
with the injured plaintiff, evidence of an
accident which injured the plaintiff is
needed; coupled with the plaintiff's heartfelt assurances that he did not misuse,
alter or even touch the product (i.e., "all
of a sudden, it just blew up") will be sufficient proof. This case takes the position
that a plaintiff's testimony will not be
self-serving. It may be too much to ask of
an injured party.
- Kevin L. Beard

New Hampshire v. Piper: OPENS
DOORS TO BAR ADMISSION
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42,
which limits bar admission to state residents, violated the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution, article IV, section 2, clause 1. By this
ruling, the Court has affected the residency
requirements for lawyers in at least twentyseven states. Low, Lawyer Residency Requirement Axed by Supreme Court, The
Daily Record, Mar. 12, 1985 at 4, col. 3.
However, Maryland is not one of the states
affected by this ruling. See, e.g., Rule 10 of
Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of
Maryland (deleted Jan. 22, 1982).
In Piper, the appellee, Kathryn Piper, a
resident of a town in Vermont, which was
located about 400 yards from the New
Hampshire border, passed the New Hampshire bar examination in 1980. She was in26- The Law Forum/Fal~ 1985

formed by the New Hampshire Board of
Bar Examiners, however, that before she
could practice law in the state of New
Hampshire she would have to become a
resident of New Hampshire pursuant to
New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42.
Appellee requested from the Clerk of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the residency requirement, explaining that her personal situation negated the convenience of becoming a New
Hampshire resident. The Clerk denied
appellee's request. Piper than petitioned
the New Hampshire Supreme Court for
permission to become a member of the
bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
denied her request. The appellee filed the
present action in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The court ruled in 1982 that the
New Hampshire residency requirement
violated the privileges and immunities
clause. New Hampshire v. Piper, 539 F.
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982). The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
ruling. New Hampshire v. Piper, 723 F.2d
110 (1st Cir. 1983).
The Court in Piper begins by discussing
the intent of the privileges and immunities
clause. The clause, according to the Court,
was intended to "fuse into one Nation
a collection of independent, sovereign
States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948). Consequently, it is "[0Jnly with
respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing on the vitality of the nation as
a single entity that a State must accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment."
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371,383 (1978). Therefore, the
privileges and immunities clause only protects fundamental rights.

The Court determined that practicing
law is a fundamental right protected by
that clause. First, one of the purposes of
the clause is "to create a national economic
union." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1276. Since
"the practice oflaw is important to the national economy," it is a fundamental right
which is protected. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1277. Second, the practice oflaw is a fundamental right because in cases where "unpopular federal claims" are raised "representation by nonresident counsel may be
the only means available for the vindication offederal rights." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1277.
In addition, the Court noted that the
practice oflaw does not involve an exercise
of state power as in In re Gnffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973), justifying a residency
requirement. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. Instead, a lawyer is a private businessman
and not "an 'officer' of the State in any political sense." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278.
Although the Court determined that
practicing law is a fundamental right, the
state can still discriminate against nonresidents where: "(i) there is a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment; and
(ii) the discrimination practiced against
nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. The Court determined, however, that New Hampshire did not show
substantial reasons that were substantially
related to the state's objective to discriminate against nonresident attorneys. First,
"[tJhere is no evidence to support the State's
claim that nonresidents might be less likely
to keep abreast of local rules and procedures." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1279. Second,
"there is no reason to believe that a nonresident lawyer will conduct his practice

